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CIRCUIT SPLIT OR A MATTER OF SEMANTICS?
THE SUPREME COURT'S UPCOMING DECISION
ON RULE 10b-5 "SCHEME LIABILITY"
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
TAX SHELTER FRAUD LITIGATION
Mark S. Pincus*
After Internal Revenue Service investigations exposed widespread fraud
among tax shelter promoters, angry investors sued for securities fraud
under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, which provides a
cause of action against "primary violators" of the Rule but not against
mere "aiders and abettors." This controversial distinction is further
complicated by the recent introduction of "scheme liability" lawsuits under
two previously obscure provisions of Rule lOb-5. This Note examines the
circuit split over the '"primary violator" '"aider and abettor" distinction in
scheme liability claims, arguing that the circuits' conflicting concepts of
scheme liability actually cover similar conduct, and that tax shelter
promoters likely will be considered primary violators under either concept.
INTRODUCTION
During the economic boom of the mid- to late 1990s, tax shelters became
a popular investment option for wealthy individuals. 1 Designed, marketed,
and implemented by groups of elite accountants, lawyers, bankers, and
financial advisors, 2 these tax shelters were promoted as legal methods for
reducing one's tax liability.3 By the close of the decade, tax shelters had
grown into a lucrative and profitable industry, garnering millions of dollars
in fees for the professionals involved.4
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; A.B., Cornell University, 2005.
I would like to thank Blair Fensterstock, Maureen McGuirl, and Professor Jill Fisch for their
guidance during the Note-writing process.
1. Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 77, 78 (2006).
2. See Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The Role of Professional Firms in
the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 9 (2005); see also infra notes 65-69
and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
4. See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 9.
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In the early 2000s, however, the federal government increased its
scrutiny of the tax shelter industry. 5 Investigations by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) 6 and the United States Senate 7 revealed that many of these
tax shelters were elaborate fraudulent schemes, built on greed, deception,
and gross violations of professional ethics.8 During these investigations,
the IRS audited many tax shelter investors, invalidating the tax savings the
investors had declared from their participation in the shelters. 9  The
investors, who had already paid high fees to set up and implement the
shelters, now owed back taxes, interest on back taxes, and penalties to the
IRS.10
Investors soon began filing lawsuits alleging that the tax shelters were
fraudulent enterprises under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).1' According to the investors' lawsuits, each
professional involved in the design, marketing, and implementation of the
tax shelters had committed fraudulent acts in furtherance of an overarching
fraudulent scheme. 12 The courts, however, almost categorically dismissed
the investors' RICO claims, citing a 1995 act of Congress that bars
plaintiffs from basing RICO claims on conduct actionable as securities
fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its
companion, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5.13
There remains some doubt as to which parties involved in a fraudulent
scheme may be held liable for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. In the
1994 case of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,14
the Supreme Court recognized a private cause of action against "primary
violators" of Rule 1Ob-5, but not against those who merely aid and abet
such Rule 1Ob-5 violations. 15  Since Central Bank, the courts have
disagreed about how to distinguish primary violators from "aiders and
abettors" under Rule 1Ob-5. 16
Although Rule lOb-5 has three provisions, 17 early interpretations of
Central Bank tended to focus exclusively on Rule lOb-5(b)'s prohibition of
5. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
6. See Joel V. Williamson et al., Litigating Transfer Pricing Cases and Tax-
Advantaged Transactions, 688 PLI/Tax 951, 1057 (2005); see also infra notes 97-100.
7. See generally S. Rep. No. 109-54.
8. See infra notes 105-34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000); see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
15. Id. at 177; see infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Parts I.C.2, II.A-B.
17. Rule 1Ob-5(a) prohibits "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"; Rule 1Ob-5(b)
prohibits material misstatements or omissions; and Rule 1Ob-5(c) prohibits "any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person." SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
[Vol. 76
2007] TAX SHELTER FRAUD AND SCHEME LIABILITY 425
material misstatements and omissions. 18 The 2002 case of In re Enron
Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation,19 however, sparked new
interest in the little-used Rules 1 Ob-5(a) and 1 Ob-5(c). 20
Since Enron, securities fraud plaintiffs have begun filing separate claims
under Rules lOb-5(a) and lOb-5(c), which scholars collectively have
referred to as "scheme liability" claims. 2 1 This emerging theory of scheme
liability, which has been called the "new battleground in securities fraud
litigation," 22 raises new questions about the scope of primary liability under
Rule lOb-5. Circuit courts addressing the issue have adopted two opposing
views on how to distinguish between primary violations and mere "aiding
and abetting" under Rules lOb-5(a) and (c). 23 The U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have adopted a narrow view of scheme
liability,24 while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
adopted a broad view.2 5 In March 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the Eighth Circuit's decision, which will be argued as
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,26 during the
Court's October 2007 Term. 27 The Stoneridge case is likely to resolve the
circuit split,2 8 which may have implications for tax shelter plaintiffs seeking
to bring claims under Rules lOb-5(a) and (c).
Part I of this Note discusses the history of tax shelters and litigation
arising from them, as well as the evolution of Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence
since Central Bank. Part II of this Note examines the circuit split as to the
dividing line between primary and "aiding and abetting" liability under
Rules 1Ob-5(a) and (c). Part III of this Note argues that, despite differences
in language, both views employ similar concepts of primary liability, and
tax shelter promoters are likely to be held as primary violators under either
view. Part III discusses how to reconcile scheme liability claims under lOb-
5(a) and (c) with the more traditional "misrepresentation or omission"
liability under Rule 1Ob-5(b).
18. See infra Part I.C.2.
19. 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 589 n.31 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
20. See Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Note, Scheme Liability: Rule lOb-5(a) and
Secondary Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 Rev. Litig. 183, 207 (2007).
21. See generally Gregory A. Markel & Gregory G. Ballard, The Evolution of "Scheme"
Liability Under Section 10(b), 1571 PLI/Corp 991 (2006); Matthew L. Mustokoff, "Scheme"
Liability Under Rule lOb-5: The New Battleground in Securities Fraud Litigation, Fed.
Law., June 2006, at 20.
22. Mustokoff, supra note 21, at 20.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007).
27. A list of cases to be argued during the October 2007 term appears on the U.S.
Supreme Court's website at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/07grantednotedlist.pdf.
28. Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, § 10(b) Secondary Actor Liability: High
Court to Resolve, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 11, 2007, at 3.
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I. TAX SHELTERS, RICO, AND SECURITIES FRAUD
Part I discusses the history of tax shelter litigation and the evolution of
securities fraud jurisprudence since the Supreme Court decided Central
Bank in 1994. Part L.A charts the rise of the tax shelter industry in the
1990s, outlines the methods that tax shelter promoters used to market the
shelters, and discusses the lawsuits filed by investors after IRS and Senate
investigations revealed that many tax shelters were fraudulent schemes.
Part I.B shows why plaintiffs' RICO claims failed in tax shelter cases,
leaving Rule 1 Ob-5 securities fraud claims as a tax shelter plaintiffs
primary federal remedy. Part I.C discusses the Supreme Court's holding in
Central Bank that only primary violators may be held liable under Rule
lOb-5 and the lower federal courts' subsequent disagreement about the
meaning of this holding.
A. Tax Shelters: A History and Background
Stated most simply, a tax shelter is an investment that capitalizes on
loopholes or ambiguities in the tax code,29 allowing investors to reduce the
amount of income tax they owe to the government.30 Because tax shelters
deprive the government of potential tax revenue, 31 their position within the
American legal landscape is precarious. Although taxpayers may lawfully
structure their affairs to minimize their income tax liability,32 outright abuse
of the tax code is prohibited. 33 As tax shelters appear in a variety of forms,
no single standard exists to determine whether a specific tax shelter is
legitimate or abusive. 34 Instead, the courts must look to a series of statutes,
judicial doctrines, and IRS publications for guidance. 35
Generally, a legitimate investment involves the investment of money to
generate income.36 The law does not permit investments created for the
sole or primary purpose of avoiding taxes. 37  Rather, a legitimate
29. See Rostain, supra note 1, at 78.
30. See Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The Role of Professional Firms in
the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1 (2005).
31. Rostain, supra note 1, at 78 (noting that tax shelters "have cost the federal
government tens of billions in lost tax revenue dollars").
32. Judge Learned Hand famously wrote that "[a]ny one may so arrange his affairs that
his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." Helvering v.
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
33. See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1.
34. The diversity of tax shelter investments makes it difficult to determine whether a tax
shelter is abusive beyond the "I know it when I see it" approach used by Justice Potter
Stewart to define obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New
Bottles, 55 Tax L. Rev. 135, 154 (2002).
35. S. Rep. No. 109-54, at I.
36. See Internal Revenue Service, Frequently Asked Tax Questions and Answers: Other
(Alternative Minimum Tax, Estates, Trusts, Tax Shelters, State Tax Inquiries),
http://www.irs.gov/faqs/faql6.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
37. Id; see also S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1.
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investment must exist for a "commercial or industrial purpose[ ]" other than
avoiding taxation 3 8 and must be "likely to produce economic benefits aside
from a tax deduction. ' 39 An easy example of a legitimate investment is
stock in General Motors, which exists for the "commercial or industrial
purpose" of manufacturing automobiles and is likely to appreciate in value
and pay dividends if the company earns profit.
Legitimate tax shelters, which have potential to generate income and
offer tax savings in proportion to the amount risked by the investor, often
involve tax benefits "clearly sanctioned by the tax laws" and "enacted
expressly as incentives for particular activities. ' 40 If a tax shelter, however,
has little or no potential to generate income and offers tax savings that are
disproportionately greater than the amount of money risked by the investor,
the IRS likely will deem it abusive. 4 1
Once the IRS has detected an abusive tax shelter, it often will challenge
the shelter's validity in court and take administrative action to prevent the
shelter's further use. The IRS also maintains a list of tax shelters it has
deemed to be potentially abusive.4 2 Taxpayers who participate in these
"listed transactions" may be subject to audit and held liable for back taxes,
interest on the back taxes, and IRS penalties for participating in an illegal
tax shelter.4 3
1. The Rise of an Industry: Tax Shelters Become a
Lucrative Business in the 1990s
Tax shelters are not a new phenomenon. Since the creation of the federal
income tax in 1913, taxpayers have sought ways to capitalize on loopholes
and ambiguities in federal tax law.44 Tax shelter investments date back to
at least the 1930s.45 During the 1970s and early 1980s, financial advisors
with knowledge of the tax code grew wealthy by creating custom-designed
investment strategies for high-income and middle-income individuals
38. Comm'r v. Transp. Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949).
This concept is commonly known as the "business purpose" doctrine. S. Rep. No. 109-54, at
4.
39. Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Comm'r, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987).
This concept is commonly known as the "economic substance" doctrine. S. Rep. No. 109-54,
at 4.
40. Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenck, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and
Policies 387 (4th ed. 2001). Some examples of legally sanctioned tax shelters are real estate
investments and investments in oil exploration ventures. See id.
41. See Rostain, supra note 1, at 84; see also Internal Revenue Service, supra note 36.
42. The most current version lists thirty abusive tax shelters. See generally I.R.S. Notice
2004-67, 2004-2 C.B. 600.
43. S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1.
44. Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 Tax
Notes 201, 201 (2004).
45. See Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes and Abusive Transactions: Why Today's
Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to "Just Say No, " 707 PLI/Tax 9,
15-16 (2006).
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seeking to reduce their taxes. 46 In 1986, however, Congress reformed the
tax code, closing many loopholes and eliminating most of the tax shelters
that existed at the time.47
Favorable economic and regulatory conditions in the mid- to late 1990s
provided a fertile climate for the resurgence of tax shelters. In the
prospering economy, many individuals and corporations realized large
capital gains from sales of stock or real estate, facing high tax bills as a
result.48 Also at that time, there was only a slight chance that "the IRS
would detect that a highly complex financial transaction [was] a tax
shelter."49  During the 1990s, the understaffed IRS lacked adequate
resources for enforcement, sharply decreasing the chance that taxpayers
would be audited. 50 In addition, taxpayers were not required to disclose tax
shelter participation on their tax returns, further diminishing the chance of
detection. 5'
Even in the event of an audit, the IRS's former penalty structure posed
little threat to tax shelter investors. 52 The tax code has long provided that
tax shelter participants who act in "good faith" and with "reasonable cause"
are not subject to penalties. 53 In the 1990s, a tax shelter investor could
satisfy this standard merely by showing good faith reliance on an
independent tax attorney's heavily researched written opinion54 concluding
that the shelter's tax treatments would "more likely than not" 55 withstand an
IRS challenge in court.56
Against this opportune backdrop, tax experts developed a new generation
of tax shelters. Taking advantage of ambiguities in the tax code, experts
46. Id. at 16. For more details on the substance of the shelters used in the 1970s and
1980s, see id. at 16-20.
47. Id. at 22.
48. See, e.g., Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580,
584 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (plaintiff realized "large capital gains from the sale of certain stock
holdings"); Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(plaintiff "sold his stock and realized a large gain").
49. Rostain, supra note 1, at 87.
50. Id. In the late 1990s, the typical time frame between the filing of a corporate tax
return and an IRS audit was five years. Id.
51. Id. at 87-88. In 2004, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to impose
penalties for failure to report tax shelter participation. The new provision appears in 26
U.S.C. § 6707A (2004).
52. In 2004 and 2005, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code, greatly increasing
penalties for participation in an abusive tax shelter. The new penalty provisions appear in 26
U.S.C. § 6662A (2005).
53. This requirement is unchanged from 1990s-era versions of the Internal Revenue
Code. The statutory language currently appears in 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2006).
54. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a
Silver Bullet, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1939, 1941 (2005).
55. "More likely than not" is generally interpreted to mean that the tax shelter has at
least a fifty-one-percent chance of holding up in court. See id. Some tax attorneys also issue
"should" level opinion letters, which represent a higher level of confidence than "more likely
than not" opinions. See id. at 1941 n.5.
56. Rostain, supra note 1, at 87.
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discovered ways to generate large artificial capital losses5 7 through a series
of "complex, orchestrated [securities] transactions. ' 58 Investors in entities
that performed these transactions could declare these losses on their tax
returns, offsetting their capital gains for the year and reducing their taxable
income. 59
These new tax shelters possessed unprecedented potential for growth into
a lucrative and profitable industry. Unlike the custom-designed tax shelters
of the 1970s and 1980s, which were based on individualized tax advice,
60
the new shelters were prefabricated strategies that could be replicated for
multiple clients. 6' Bearing closer resemblance to a generic product than
individualized tax advice, the new tax shelters lent themselves well to mass
marketing. 62 Also, successful implementation of these tax shelters required
the cooperation of skilled professionals, 63 all of whom could charge the
investor high fees for their services. 64
Sensing the potential for financial gain, groups of major players in the
fields of accounting, 65 law, 66 banking,6 7 and financial advice68 quickly
57. Artificial capital losses are "noneconomic losses . . . which are available as
deductions under present tax laws." Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 183 (8th Cir.
1982) (internal citations omitted). In essence, tax law allows the taxpayer to declare a loss
on his tax return, even though the taxpayer did not actually experience an economic loss.
58. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The Role of Professional Firms in the
U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 9 (2005). A substantive understanding of
the methods used by these tax shelters to generate losses is not necessary for this Note. The
IRS has provided further details on the substance of these tax shelters, enumerating the
current "listed transactions" and providing cross-references to specific IRS notices with
detailed descriptions of these tax shelters. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-67, 2004-2 C.B. 600. To
date, most published tax shelter cases have involved the "COBRA" tax shelter allegedly
developed and marketed by Ernst & Young, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Brown & Wood, and
Deutsche Bank. For a description of this shelter, see Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.,
341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
59. See Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (stating that the plaintiffs tax returns used the
shelter's losses to "offset and reduce [plaintiffs'] tax liability").
60. See Korb, supra note 45, at 23 ("Rather than providing tax planning advice to
individual clients based on their particular circumstances, these transactions were developed
in a way that made them easy to replicate and promote to a variety of clients and non-clients
alike.").
61. See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 9 ("[T]he industry focus has expanded to developing a
steady supply of generic 'tax products' that can be aggressively marketed to multiple
clients.").
62. Id.
63. Id. at 5 ("These tax shelters required close collaboration between accounting firms,
law firms, investment advisory firms, and banks.").
64. See id. at 70.
65. The accounting firms included KPMG and Ernst & Young. See id. at 6.
66. The law firms included Brown & Wood (later Sidley Austin Brown & Wood). See
id. at 11. Jenkens & Gilchrist also was actively involved in the tax shelter business. See
Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
67. The investment banks included Deutsche Bank and UBS. See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at
11.
68. The financial advisors included Presidio Advisory Services and Quadra Advisors.
See id.
FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
moved to the forefront of the developing industry. 69  Through the
cooperative efforts of these professionals, the tax shelter industry rapidly
grew into an efficient and profitable business focused on creating,
implementing, and mass marketing generic tax products. 70 Although
individual professionals had varying roles in tax shelter enterprises, this
Note collectively refers to all parties involved in the design, marketing,
and/or implementation of tax shelters as "promoters."
2. The Hustle: Marketing and Implementing Tax Shelters
Once a group of promoters had designed a shelter and devised its
methods for generating artificial capital losses, the marketing and
implementation of the tax shelter generally followed a common pattern.
Whereas earlier tax shelters depended on "persons who initiate[d] contact
with a tax advisor,"71 the new tax shelter promoters affirmatively sought
out investors. 72 In the drive for potential participants, tax shelter promoters
actively targeted their own clients73 and networked to obtain referrals from
among other professionals' wealthy client bases. 74 The most aggressive tax
shelter promoters even resorted to contacting potential investors through
unsolicited telephone calls. 75
Among the key targets of tax shelter marketing were wealthy
individuals 76 facing high tax liabilities from large recent capital gains. 77
These individuals often were introduced to tax shelters by promoters with
whom they had an existing fiduciary relationship. 78  Such fiduciary
promoters capitalized on the knowledge that the individuals planned to
realize, 79 or had already realized, large capital gains.80 The promoters then
69. See Rostain, supra note 1, at 78 ("Elite professionals played a prominent role in the
emergence of this market. Large accounting firms, investment banks, and corporate law
firms all became involved, designing and marketing hundreds of highly lucrative shelters.").
70. See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 9.
71. Id.
72. See Pollack & Soled, supra note 44, at 204.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 34. These unsolicited phone calls often are referred to as
"cold calls." Id.
76. See, e.g., King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 WL 611954, at *2
(D. Or. Mar. 6, 2005) (stating that "defendants allegedly recruited the other defendants to
assist them in locating wealthy clients"). Tax shelter promoters also targeted corporations
for participation in tax shelters. See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1. This Note, however, focuses
on tax shelters promoted to individuals and the resulting lawsuits.
77. Pollack & Soled, supra note 44, at 204.
78. See, e.g., Heller v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ.A. 04-CV-3571, 2005 WL 525401,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2005) (indicating that plaintiffs' "longtime accountants" introduced
them to the tax shelter); Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 368
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (indicating that plaintiff was introduced to the tax shelter by his
accountant).
79. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
80. See King, 2005 WL 611954, at *20.
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informed their clients about the tax shelters and set up meetings and
telephone conferences with other promoters. 8'
Potential tax shelter investors generally were subject to similar sales
proposals. Through a series of meetings, multiple promoters assured the
potential investors that the tax shelter was a legitimate investment 82 and that
its tax benefits were likely to hold up in court if challenged by the IRS. 83
These promoters promised independent opinion letters from experienced
large-firm tax attorneys certifying the legality of the tax shelter.84 The
promoters assured the potential investor that, in the event of an audit, the
opinion letters provided sufficient protection against IRS-imposed
penalties.85 Convinced by elite professionals that the tax shelters were legal
investments, many wealthy individuals chose to participate. 86 Participation
made economic sense, as the investors' tax liabilities often dwarfed the fees
and costs associated with implementing a tax shelter. 87
Once the investor agreed to participate, the promoters would begin
implementing the shelter. Although their precise methods for generating
losses varied, most of these tax shelters were structured in a similar
manner. First, the investor would invest in a series of corporate,
partnership, and/or limited liability entities, which had been set up by the
promoters. 88 Then, a promoter (usually an investment banker or a financial
advisor) 89 would engage in a series of complex, orchestrated securities
81. See, e.g., Heller, 2005 WL 525401, at *6 (indicating that accountant-promoter set up
meetings between plaintiff and other lawyer-promoters and banker-promoters); Stechler v.
Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(indicating that plaintiff's "long-term accountant" set up meetings with financial advisor-
promoter to "discuss tax shelters").
82. "Legitimate" implies that the investment had a reasonable ability to generate profits.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 367
(noting that promoters represented investment as "legitimate").
83. See Stechler, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (stating that promoters assured plaintiff that the
tax shelter strategy "would more than likely pass IRS scrutiny if [plaintiff] were ever
audited").
84. See, e.g., id. at 584 (noting that promoter promised letter from Brown & Wood);
Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (noting that promoter promised letters from Brown & Wood
and Jenkens & Gilchrist).
85. See id.
86. See generally Heller v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ.A. 04-CV-3571, 2005 WL
525401 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2005); King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005
WL 611954 (D. Or. Mar. 8, 2005); Stechler, 382 F. Supp. 2d 580; Blythe v. Deutsche Bank
AG, 399 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); RA Investments I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG,
No. Civ.A.3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL 1356446 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005); Swartz v.
KPMG, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F.
Supp. 2d 1172 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d 363; Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No.
02-81166-CIV, 2003 WL 22225621 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2003).
87. See Rostain, supra note 1, at 86.
88. See, e.g., RA Investments, 2005 WL 1356446, at * 1 (partnerships and corporations);
Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (partnerships, corporations, and limited liability companies).
89. See, e.g., Stechler, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (indicating that DGI, a financial advisor,
conducted the transactions); Swartz, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (indicating that Presidio, a
financial advisor, conducted the transactions); Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (indicating
that Deutsche Bank, an investment banker, conducted the transactions).
2007]
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transactions on behalf of the entities. 90 These transactions, which often
involved foreign or tax-exempt parties, 9 1 generated large artificial capital
losses.92 Generally, the opinion letters were delivered a few months after
the transactions were conducted. 93 An accountant-promoter would then
prepare the investor's tax returns, using the artificial losses generated by the
tax shelter to offset the investor's capital gains. 94
In addition to the money invested in the shelter, tax shelter investors paid
large fees to promoters for setting up the necessary business entities,
conducting the transactions necessary to generate the artificial capital
losses, and preparing tax returns reflecting losses generated by the tax
shelter.95 The investors also paid fees to the attorneys for the opinion
letters certifying the tax shelter's legality. 96
3. The Backlash: Angry Investors File Suit Against
Tax Shelter Promoters After IRS Audits
By 2000, the federal government had begun to scrutinize the new crop of
tax shelters, strongly increasing its enforcement efforts against abusive tax
shelter arrangements. The IRS formed the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis
(OTSA) to monitor tax shelter activity9 7 and began publishing lists of
potentially abusive transactions.9 8 The IRS also increased the number of
taxpayer audits99 and investigations of tax shelter promoters. 10 0  As
revealed through IRS investigations and a Senate probe of major
promoters,' 0 ' the tax shelter industry's transgressions stretched beyond
mere abuse of the tax code. 10 2 During the industry's rapid transformation
into big business, promoters often disregarded professional ethics and
90. See Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The Role of Professional Firms in
the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 10 (2005).
91. See Korb, supra note 45, at 23.
92. See, e.g., Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (noting that the tax shelter generated $12
million in artificial losses for plaintiff).
93. See, e.g., id. at 369-70; Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIV, 2003 WL
22225621, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2003).
94. See, e.g., Stechler, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 585-86.
95. Id. at 584-86.
96. See, e.g., Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
97. Williamson, supra note 6, at 1056.
98. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255. The most recent abusive transaction
list appears as I.R.S. Notice 2004-67, 2004-2 C.B. 600.
99. Williamson, supra note 6, at 1060.
100. Id. at 1057.
101. Beginning in October 2002, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs began an investigation into the
development, marketing, and implementation of tax shelters. The Subcommittee, which
probed such major tax shelter promoters as KPMG, Ernst & Young, Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood, and Deutsche Bank, conducted hearings in November 2003 and published a formal
report of its findings in February 2005. See Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The
Role of Professional Firms in the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1-2
(2005).
102. See infra notes 104-34 and accompanying text.
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breached their fiduciary duties by committing fraud against their own
clients. 103
The most unfortunate casualties of the government's crackdown on
abusive tax shelters were the investors. Relying on misinformation, tax
shelter investors participated in abusive tax shelters believing they had
found a legal way to save money. 10 4 After the IRS invalidated the shelters'
tax benefits, investors found themselves in a worse financial position than if
they had never gotten involved. In addition to the high fees they had paid
to tax shelter promoters, 05 investors owed the government back taxes,
interest on back taxes, and IRS-imposed penalties.10 6
As the IRS intensified its scrutiny of tax shelters, an increasing number
of investors filed suit, 10 7 alleging that the tax shelters were well-
orchestrated fraudulent schemes. 10 8 In these lawsuits, plaintiff-investors
allege that the promoters had worked together to design, market, and
implement tax shelter investments with knowledge that the IRS likely
would declare the shelters abusive and disregard their tax benefits.' 0 9
According to plaintiff-investors, each tax shelter promoter played an
assigned role in advancing the tax shelter scheme through fraudulent
misstatements, omissions, and acts.' 10
The lawsuits allege that tax shelter promoters fraudulently
misrepresented the shelters as legitimate investments with reasonable
potential to generate profits"'l and tax benefits likely to withstand an IRS
challenge. 112 According to plaintiffs, some promoters even continued
marketing tax shelters similar to those that had already been listed by the
IRS as potentially abusive.' '3 The most aggressive promoters allegedly
even represented the investments as "no-lose" 114 or "conservative." 1 15
103. See id.
104. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., RA Investments I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ.A.3:04-CV-1565-
G, 2005 WL 1356446, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005) (noting that plaintiffs "paid substantial
amounts of money in fees to the defendants").
106. See id.
107. See Williamson, supra note 6, at 1060.
108. See, e.g., RA Investments, 2005 WL 1356446, at *3 (indicating that plaintiffs allege
that tax shelter "constituted a scheme to defraud them").
109. See, e.g., Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 368 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (noting that plaintiffs alleged that "defendants either knew or should have known from
the outset that the [tax shelter] would not pass muster with the IRS").
110. See id. at 367 (indicating that plaintiffs alleged that defendants "entered into an
alliance to operate, market, and promote these tax shelters").
111. See, e.g., RA Investments, 2005 WL 1356446, at *3 (noting that defendants
concealed that the investment underlying the tax shelter scheme "had no reasonable
possibility of a profit").
112. See, e.g., Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580,
583 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that defendant assured that the tax shelter "would more than
likely pass IRS scrutiny," a representation that defendants allegedly "knew or should have
known was false").
113. See, e.g., King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 WL 611954, at *3
(D. Or. Mar. 6, 2005) ("[D]efendants continued to promote the [tax shelter] strategy after
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
The lawsuits further claim that tax shelter promoters misrepresented the
roles of the lawyers. 116 In their sales proposals, promoters purportedly
represented that plaintiffs would receive independent attorneys' opinion
letters certifying the shelters' legality, which would protect plaintiffs from
IRS penalties in the event of an audit. 17 Plaintiffs assert that, in truth, the
attorneys who issued opinions were also promoters who helped design the
shelters."18 As the IRS generally disregards opinion letters furnished by
interested parties, these legal opinions likely provided no protection to
investors. 119  Some tax shelter promoters even forbade investors from
seeking review from outside lawyers or accountants, asserting that the tax
shelters were "proprietary" and therefore confidential. 120
The lawsuits also allege that promoters committed fraudulent acts while
implementing the shelters. According to plaintiffs, lawyer-promoters
issued legal opinions knowing that their lack of independence likely
rendered the opinions invalid 121 and the underlying shelters were unlikely
to withstand an IRS challenge. 122 Moreover, the lawsuits claim that the
accountants, bankers, and financial advisors set up corporate, partnership,
and limited liability entities expressly for use in an abusive tax shelter
scheme and conducted transactions that were expressly intended to generate
artificial losses for use in the scheme. 123 Additionally, plaintiffs allege that
the accountants knowingly prepared tax returns reflecting losses generated
by a potentially abusive tax shelter. 124
Notice 2000-44 was issued, even though at least [one of the] defendants had internally
concluded that the Notice raised serious concerns.").
114. Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
115. Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
116. See infra notes 117-20.
117. Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (stating that the promoter allegedly represented that
the opinion letter "would serve as a protection against the imposition of tax penalties").
118. See, e.g., RA Investments, 2005 WL 1356446, at *3 (noting that law firm provided
allegedly independent legal advice, but failed to disclose that it devised the tax shelter
strategy).
119. The law abates penalties for tax shelter participants who rely on legal opinions under
the "assumption that the lawyer will engage in disinterested and diligent efforts to ascertain
her client's legal obligations." Rostain, supra note 1, at 93. A "tax opinion letter provided
by a person with a financial stake in the tax product being analyzed has traditionally been
accorded much less deference than an opinion letter supplied by a disinterested expert."
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The Role of Professional Firms in the U.S. Tax
Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 47 (2005).
120. Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
121. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' allegations that the lawyer-promoters knew that their
"undisclosed role in marketing and promoting the shelters both compromised their
objectivity and 'presented a risk that the [tax authorities] would and could claim that the
opinion letters.. . would not shield them from the assessment of penalties').
122. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' allegations that "defendants either knew or should have
known from the outset that the [tax shelter] would not pass muster with the IRS").
123. See, e.g., Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580,
584-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
124. See, e.g., id. at 585-86.
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Furthermore, promoters allegedly charged excessive fees for their
services, often in violation of their professional ethics. 125 According to
plaintiffs, lawyer-promoters charged excessive fees for "canned"'126 legal
opinions that required little effort to produce. 27 Once an attorney had
drafted an opinion letter for a specific tax shelter, the original letter was
used as a template. 128 Opinion letters for subsequent investors usually were
identical to the template except for the client's name and contained no new
facts or analysis. 12 9 Often, the attorney did not even consult with the client
before drafting the opinion letter. 130 This practice likely runs afoul of the
American Bar Association's Rules of Professional Conduct, which cite "the
time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly" as
relevant factors in deciding how much to charge for legal services. 13 1
Accountant-promoters often enacted contingency fee arrangements that
were "fixed at a percentage of a client's anticipated tax savings,"' 132 a
practice contrary to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'
Code of Professional Ethics 133 and heavily limited by a number of state and
federal regulations.13
4
B. The Failure of RICO Claims in Tax Shelter Lawsuits
In addition to state law claims for fraud, malpractice, and breach of
fiduciary duty, plaintiffs initially alleged that the promoters had operated a
fraudulent enterprise in violation of RICO. 13 5 RICO, enacted by Congress
in 1970 to combat organized crime, 136 allows private plaintiffs injured by a
125. See Code of Prof'I Ethics R. 302(2) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006)
(providing that an accountant shall not "[p]repare an original or amended tax return or claim
for a tax refund for a contingent fee for any client"); Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.5
(2002) ("A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable
fee.").
126. Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
127. See id.
128. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The Role of Professional Firms in the
U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 106 (2005).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.5 (2002).
132. Rostain, supra note 1, at 90.
133. Code of Prof'I Ethics R. 302(2) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006).
134. See Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, The Role of Professional Firms in
the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 71 (2005) ("Many states prohibit
accounting firms from charging contingent fees due to the improper incentives they create,
and a number of SEC, IRS, state, and AICPA rules allow their use in only limited
circumstances.").
135. See infra Part I.B. 1-4. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) appears at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000).
136. See Daniel Z. Herbst, Note, Injunctive Relief and Civil RICO: After Scheidler v.
National Organization for Women, Inc., RICO's Scope and Remedies Require Reevaluation,
53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1125, 1130 (2004).
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"pattern of racketeering activity"' 137 to file civil suits in federal court. 138 To
demonstrate a "pattern," a plaintiff must show at least two predicate acts of
racketeering activity within a ten-year period. 139 Tax shelter investors
generally predicated their RICO claims on mail and wire fraud, 140 alleging
that the promoters advanced the fraudulent scheme by communicating
fraudulent statements and conducting fraudulent transactions through
telephone calls, e-mails, and letters.' 41
Civil RICO actions are especially attractive causes of action for
plaintiffs, since RICO entitles successful plaintiffs to treble damages and
attorney's fees. 142 In 1995, Congress became concerned that plaintiffs
injured by securities fraud were proceeding under RICO to take advantage
of its generous damage provisions.143 Convinced that the law of securities
fraud provided adequate protection for plaintiffs and that exposing a
securities fraud defendant to treble damages was unfair, 144 Congress passed
section 107 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA). 145 Congress intended this section to remove securities fraud as a
predicate act for RICO and to prevent plaintiffs from pleading "other
specified offenses, such as mail or wire fraud, as predicate acts under civil
RICO if such offenses are based on conduct that would have been
actionable as securities fraud."' 146 Section 107 amended RICO to provide
that "no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable
as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of
[RICO]."'1 47
The Securities Act of 1933148 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934149
(the Acts) enumerate a list of instruments that are considered "securities"
under federal law.' 50  The definition encompasses most investment
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Black's Law Dictionary defines "racketeering" as "[a] pattern
of illegal activity (such as bribery, extortion, fraud, and murder) carried out as part of an
enterprise (such as a crime syndicate) that is owned or controlled by those engaged in the
illegal activity." Black's Law Dictionary 1286-87 (8th ed. 2004). For a list of violations
considered "racketeering" under RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The list includes mail fraud,
wire fraud, and bank fraud. Id.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
140. See, e.g., Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175-76 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
141. See id. at 1176.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
143. Todd A. Noteboom & Michael A.G. Korengold, Nunc Pro Tunc: The Application of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to Pending Civil RICO Claims Based on
Securities Fraud, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 565, 572-73 (1997).
144. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
145. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
146. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 47.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006).
150. The Supreme Court has held that the definitions of "security" under both acts are
"virtually identical." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
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instruments, including stocks, bonds, and options. 15 1 Under the PSLRA
bar, a plaintiff may not plead fraud committed "in [connection] with the
purchase or sale of securities" as a predicate offense to a RICO claim. 152
As the Supreme Court most recently reiterated in SEC v. Zandford,153 the
securities laws are meant to be "construed 'not technically and restrictively,
but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.""' 154 Therefore, the
courts generally have interpreted the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities" broadly. 155 Since Zandford, the courts have
dismissed RICO claims in any tax shelter case where the tax shelter had
some relationship to the sale of securities during its existence. 1 56
Courts have held tax shelter fraud to be "in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities" when the tax shelters generated artificial losses
through securities transactions, 157 when plaintiffs sought to shelter capital
gains realized from the sale of securities, 158 and when tax shelter plans
required plaintiffs to purchase security interests in entities that performed
the artificial loss-generating transactions on plaintiffs' behalf.159 Courts
also have rejected arguments that a plaintiffs RICO claim should be
preserved because the promoter's primary objective was "phony tax advice"
rather than the sale of securities. 160 Furthermore, courts have rejected the
argument that each individual act in furtherance of a tax shelter scheme
should be assessed separately under the PLSRA bar. 
161
1. RICO Claims Dismissed Because the Tax Shelter Generated Losses
Through the Sale of Securities
Courts have found that an alleged fraudulent tax shelter scheme was "in
connection with" the sale of securities in cases where the tax shelter
generated losses through the sale of securities. In Stechler v. Sidley, Austin,
Brown & Wood, L.L.P.,16 2 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the alleged fraud was "in connection with" the sale
of securities because one of the assets that plaintiff bought and sold to
generate artificial losses was common stock, which is listed as a "security"
under the Acts. 163 Although plaintiff argued that his RICO claims should
151. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
153. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
154. Id. at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972)).
155. See id.
156. See infra Part I.B.1-4.
157. See infra Part I.B.1.
158. See infra Part 1.B.2.
159. See infra Part I.B.3.
160. See infra Part I.B.4.
161. See infra Part I.B.4.
162. 382 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
163. Id. at 598; see also RA Investments I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ.A. 3:04-
CV-1565-G, 2005 WL 1356446, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005) (dismissing plaintiff's RICO
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be preserved because the tax shelter could have generated artificial losses
with assets other than stock, the Stechler court rejected plaintiff's argument,
holding that "[a]ll that matters is that the alleged fraud which is actually...
before the Court did involve securities."' 164
2. RICO Claims Dismissed Because Plaintiffs Sought to Shelter Capital
Gains Realized from the Sale of Securities
Even if the tax shelters did not generate losses from the sale of securities,
a number of courts have found an alleged fraudulent tax shelter scheme to
be "in connection with" the sale of securities when the capital gains that
plaintiff sought to shelter were realized from the sale of securities. In
Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.,165 plaintiff's accountant knew that
plaintiff was about to leave his job, exercise his stock options, and sell the
resulting stock. 166 The accountant proposed a tax shelter that used currency
option exchanges to generate artificial capital losses, which plaintiff
invested in once he sold stock in his company. 167 In opposing plaintiffs
RICO claims, defendants did not raise the issue of whether the currency
options were securities. 168 However, defendants argued that the alleged tax
shelter fraud was "in connection with" the sale of securities because "there
would have been no gain for the [tax shelter] to offset" if plaintiff had not
sold stock in his company. 169 In dismissing plaintiffs RICO claim, the
court held that plaintiffs sale of his company stock was "integrally related
to the fraudulent scheme," since defendants "took advantage of their
knowledge of [plaintiffs] planned securities transaction to induce him" to
participate in the tax shelter. 170 In King v. Deutsche Bank A G, 171 plaintiff
attempted to distinguish Seippel, arguing that the holding in Seippel did not
apply to him because the defendants in his case did not approach him about
the tax shelter until after he sold his stock. 172 The King court rejected
plaintiffs argument, holding that in both Seippel and King "the objective
was to avoid paying taxes on gains realized from the sale of stock" and
therefore that "[t]he date on which the gains accrued is immaterial."' 173
claim after determining that the option contracts plaintiffs sold to generate losses for a tax
shelter scheme were securities).
164. Stechler, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
165. 341 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
166. Id. at 368-69.
167. Id. at 369.
168. See id. at 372.
169. Id. at 373.
170. Id. at 374.
171. No. CV-04-1029-HU, 2005 WL 611954 (D. Or. Mar. 8, 2005).
172. Id. at *20.
173. Id.
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3. RICO Claims Dismissed Because the Tax Shelter Required Plaintiff to
Purchase Security Interests in Entities That Performed the Loss-Generating
Transactions on Plaintiffs Behalf
Recent cases also suggest that courts may find an alleged fraudulent tax
shelter scheme to be "in connection with" the sale of securities when
plaintiffs involvement in a tax shelter required the purchase of security
interests in entities that performed loss-generating transactions on plaintiff's
behalf. In Heller v. Deutsche Bank AG, 174 defendants argued that the
alleged fraud was "in connection with" the sale of securities because the tax
shelter required plaintiffs to "form and purchase shares in S corporations in
order to participate."' 175 Although the court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss because a question of fact existed as to whether the shares were
truly stock, the court held that defendants were "free to re-argue this point
via motion for summary judgment."' 176 This implies that the RICO claims
would be dismissed if the S corporation shares were truly considered stock,
which is a security. 177
4. Failed Arguments Attempted to Circumvent the PSLRA Bar and
Establish RICO Liability in Tax Shelter Cases
Tax shelter plaintiffs have put forth a number of unsuccessful arguments
while attempting to circumvent the PSLRA bar. When an alleged tax
shelter scheme has involved the sale of securities, courts have dismissed
plaintiffs' RICO claims against all defendants, regardless of a defendant's
alleged motivations for inducing plaintiff to participate. In Loftin v. KPMG
LLP,'7 8 plaintiff argued that his RICO claim against his lawyers should be
preserved because the lawyers' "primary objective" in the tax shelter was
"not the sale of securities, but the sale of 'phony tax advice."' 1 79 The court
rejected plaintiffs argument, holding that the tax shelter transactions
"consisted of the purchase and sale of securities," and, therefore, the "phony
tax advice" given by the lawyers was "in connection with" the sale of
securities. 180
When considering whether an alleged tax shelter scheme is "in
connection with" the sale of securities, courts commonly have looked at the
entire scheme rather than each individual act within the scheme. Generally,
the courts have dismissed RICO claims when at least one act within the
174. No. Civ.A. 04-CV-3571, 2005 WL 525401 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2005).
175. Id. at *4.
176. Id.
177. See id; see also Blythe v. Deutsche Bank AG, 399 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) ("[A]s in Heller, the complaint here does not provide enough information to determine
whether the S corporation 'stocks' at issue constitute 'securities' . . . . Once the record is
more fully developed, [defendant] may renew this argument on summary judgment.").
178. No. 02-81166-CIV, 2003 WL 22225621 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2003).
179. Id. at *6.
180. Id.
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scheme was directly related to the sale of securities, even if other acts were
not. In Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, 181 plaintiff filed a RICO claim against his
accountant, alleging eight different acts of mail and wire fraud in the
promotion of tax shelter strategies. 182 In his report and recommendation,
the magistrate judge dismissed the RICO claims as to the fraudulent
representations that clearly involved securities, including the phone
conversations where the accountant induced plaintiff to participate in the
tax shelter and the wire transfers that the accountant used to complete the
stock transactions.18 3 However, the magistrate judge preserved plaintiff's
claims as to acts that did not involve securities, such as the accountant's
engagement letter, which improperly tried to insulate the accountant from
liability, and the accountant's mailing of a misleading tax return for
plaintiff, holding that the "remaining predicate acts . . . have no readily
apparent connection to securities transactions." 184  The district judge
overruled the magistrate judge's findings and dismissed plaintiffs entire
RICO claim, holding that since plaintiff "contend[ed] the wrongful acts
were committed as part of a single fraudulent scheme, all of the acts must
be considered together for securities fraud purposes."' 185
C. The Great Securities Fraud Controversy: Distinguishing Primary
Violators from "Aiders and Abettors" in Rule 10b-5 Lawsuits
The overwhelming failure of RICO claims in tax shelter cases leaves
securities fraud as the primary means for investors to establish liability
against tax shelter promoters under federal law. The private cause of
action 186 for securities fraud is rooted in section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful for "any person, directly or
indirectly" to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" that
contravenes SEC rules and regulations. 187
SEC Rule 1Ob-5, which accompanies section 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange; (a) To employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) To make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
181. 314 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
182. Id. at 1176-77.
183. Id. at 1177.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1179.
186. Although the language of section 10(b) does not expressly create a private cause of
action, the Supreme Court has implied one. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (holding that "[i]t is now established that a
private right of action is implied under § 10(b)").
187. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
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they were made, not misleading; or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
188
However, plaintiffs seeking to establish Rule 1Ob-5 liability against all
parties involved in promoting fraudulent tax shelters face an additional
obstacle. Since the Supreme Court decided Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver 89 in 1994, the courts no longer recognize "aiding
and abetting securities fraud" as a valid cause of action under Rule I Ob-
5.190 As a result, only defendants deemed "primary violators" of Rule lOb-
5 are held liable, while those deemed mere "aiders and abettors" of the lOb-
5 violation escape liability. 19 1  Since Central Bank, courts often have
disagreed over where to place the dividing line between primary violations
of Rule lOb-5 and mere "aiding and abetting."' 192 In tax shelter schemes,
where promoters had varying roles in the marketing and implementation of
the shelter, Central Bank and its progeny are important to consider.
1. Central Bank: No Cause of Action for
Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud
Before the Supreme Court decided Central Bank, almost every federal
circuit allowed I Ob-5 suits against both primary violators and "aiders and
abettors."' 193 In fact, liability for aiding and abetting lOb-5 violations had
become so firmly ingrained in securities fraud jurisprudence that neither
party in Central Bank challenged its legitimacy. 194 Instead, the Court sua
sponte directed the parties to address whether section 10(b) permitted
private lOb-5 suits against aiders and abettors.195
With Justice Anthony Kennedy writing for a slim 5-4 majority, the
Central Bank Court eliminated aider and abettor liability in securities fraud
cases.196 Holding that a "private plaintiff may not bring a lOb-5 suit against
a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b),"' 19 7 the Court
noted that the language of section 10(b) prohibited "the making of a
material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative
act,"' 198 but made no mention of aiding and abetting such conduct. 199
188. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
189. 511 U.S. 164(1994).
190. Id. at 191.
191. See infra Part I.C.1.
192. See infra Part I.C.2.
193. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At the time, eleven circuits
allowed private plaintiffs to sue parties who aided and abetted other parties' Rule lob-5
violations. Id. Although the D.C. Circuit had not considered whether private plaintiffs could
sue aiders and abettors, it allowed the SEC to bring actions against them. See id. at 192 n. 1.
194. Id. at 194.
195. Id. at 194-95.
196. Id. at 191 (majority opinion).
197. Id. at 173.
198. Id. at 177 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)).
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Asserting that Congress would have mentioned "aiding and abetting" in the
statutory language if it intended to impose such liability, 20 0 the Court held
that "the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a
§ 10(b) violation."201 Since the text of section 10(b) did not cover aiding
and abetting, the Central Bank Court held that "a private plaintiff may not
maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b). ' '202
The Court, however, held that "[t]he absence of § 10(b) aiding and
abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors ... are always free
from liability under the securities Acts." 20 3 Rather, "[a]ny person or entity,
including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies" may be "liable as a primary violator
under 1Ob-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under
Rule lOb-5 are met. '20 4
In ruling that private plaintiffs may not maintain Rule lOb-5 suits against
aiders and abettors, the Central Bank Court sparked great controversy over
a previously non-controversial issue.2°5 The Central Bank case transformed
the distinction between a "primary violator" and a mere "aider and abettor"
from a largely academic exercise into a significant factor in determining
Rule lOb-5 liability. Central Bank, however, failed to provide meaningful
insight into how the distinction between "primary violation" and "aiding
and abetting" should be made. Since 1994, the lower federal courts have
grappled with Central Bank's ambiguous language, often reaching
disagreement about its implications for 1Ob-5 liability.
2. Liability for Misrepresentations and Omissions Under Rule 1Ob-5(b)
Although Rule lOb-5 has three provisions, 20 6 earlier cases attempting to
clarify Central Bank's "primary violator"/"aider and abettor" dichotomy
focused solely on claims for misrepresentations and omissions under Rule
199. Id. The Court rejected the argument that the "directly or indirectly" language in
section 10(b) imposes aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 176 ("[A]iding and abetting
liability extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding
and abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all,
but who give a degree of aid to those who do.").
200. Id. at 176-77 (holding that "Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting
liability when it chose to do so" and if "Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting
liability, we presume it would have used the words 'aid' and 'abet' in the statutory text. But
it did not.").
201. Id. at 177.
202. Id. at 191.
203. Id. at 191. In this sense, a "secondary actor" is someone who does not purchase or
sell the actual securities. One's status as a "secondary actor" in the securities market is a
separate consideration from whether that person is a "primary violator" or "aider and
abettor" under section 10(b).
204. Id.
205. See Schanbaum, supra note 20, at 190.
206. See SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
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1Ob-5(b). In these cases, investors filed suit under 1Ob-5, claiming that a
company fraudulently misrepresented its financial situation through
misleading financial statements. 207 The courts then decided whether certain
parties that helped the corporation prepare the fraudulent financial
statements could be held liable as primary violators under Rule 1 Ob-5. 208
From these lawsuits emerged three conflicting standards for distinguishing
between "primary violators" and mere "aiders and abettors" of Rule I Ob-
5(b) violations. These three standards have become known as the "bright-
line" test, 20 9 the "substantial participation" test, 21 0 and the "creator" test.2 11
a. The Bright-Line Test
The Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the bright-line
test for differentiating between "primary violators" and "aiders and
abettors" in Rule lOb-5 lawsuits.212 To be held as a primary violator under
the bright-line test, a defendant must personally make a fraudulent
misstatement or omission,213 and the misstatement or omission must be
attributed to the defendant at the time the plaintiffs investment decision
was made. 214 The defendant, however, need not "directly communicate
misrepresentations to plaintiffs for primary liability to attach. ' 215 Rather, it
is enough that the defendant "knew or should have known" that the
statement would reach potential investors.2 16
Under the bright-line test, lending "'significant' or 'substantial'
assistance to the representations of others" is not enough to impose primary
liability on a defendant.2 17 The Second Circuit expressed the essence of the
bright-line test in holding that, "[i]f Central Bank is to have any real
meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in
207. See, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2000); Wright
v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1998); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717,
718 (2d Cir. 1997); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 1996);
In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 1994).
208. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
209. Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. Rev. 691, 728
(1997).
210. Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver After
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 367, 375 (2006).
211. Kimberly Brame, Comment, Beyond Misrepresentations: Defining Primary and
Secondary Liability Under Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule lOb-5, 67 La. L. Rev. 935, 940
(2007). The "creator" test is also known as the "co-author" test. See Schanbaum, supra note
20, at 202.
212. See Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11 th Cir. 2001); Shapiro,
123 F.3d at 720; Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1225-27.
213. See Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226.
214. Ziemba, 256 F.3d at 1205 (citing Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175
(2d Cir. 1998).
215. Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1227.
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order to be held liable under Section 10(b)." 2 18 The Second Circuit further
held that "[a]nything short of such conduct .. . is merely aiding and
abetting, and no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to
trigger liability under Section 10(b)." 2 19 Unless the statement is made in
the defendant's name, the bright-line test will treat the defendant as no more
than an aider and abettor.220
The major criticism of the bright-line test is its "potential to allow
egregious wrongdoing to go unpunished and serious fraud-inflicted injuries
to go uncompensated." z22 1 Under the bright-line test, a lawyer or accountant
who participated heavily in the drafting of a company's fraudulent financial
statement with knowledge of the fraud, but did not attach his or her name to
the document, would be considered an "aider and abettor" and escape
liability in a Rule 1Ob-5 suit filed by an investor who relied on the
statement. Such a rule encourages background actors to conceal their
identities from investors. 222 Because the Supreme Court has stated that the
securities laws should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes, ' 223 the rigidity of the bright-
line test seems almost counterintuitive to the remedial spirit of the securities
laws.
b. The Substantial Participation Test
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the substantial participation test for
differentiating between primary violators and "aiders and abettors" in Rule
I Ob-5 lawsuits. 224 In addition to holding defendants liable for making self-
attributed fraudulent misstatements or omissions, the substantial
participation test imposes liability on defendants who "substantial ly]
participat[ed]" or were "intricate[ly] involve[d]" in the misrepresentations
or omissions attributed to another actor.225  Under the substantial
participation test, a background actor may be held liable as a primary
violator for substantially participating in the misstatements or omissions of
218. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re MTC Elec.
Techs. S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
219. Id. (quoting MTC, 898 F. Supp. at 987).
220. See Prentice, supra note 209, at 728-29.
221. Id. at 727-28.
222. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587 (S.D.
Tex. 2002).
223. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
224. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Software
Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994).
225. Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 n.5; see also Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 628 n.3
(holding an accountant to be a primary violator for "play[ing] a significant role in drafting
and editing" a software company's letter to the SEC containing fraudulent financial data,
even though the accountant's name did not appear on the letter).
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another, even if the defendant did not communicate the misrepresentation to
the investor or associate his name with the misstatements or omissions.
226
The substantial participation test has been criticized for being overly
broad 227 and potentially imposing primary liability on conduct that pre-
Central Bank courts would have considered "aiding and abetting." 228 As
one critic has asserted, "This standard seems directly at odds with Central
Bank" as "it employs the pre-Central Bank vernacular of aiding and
abetting liability. ' 229  "Before Central Bank," argues the critic, "a
defendant could be liable for aiding and abetting a violation of § 10(b)...
by lending 'substantial assistance' to the primary violator with knowledge
of the fraud."' 230 The Ninth Circuit's test, he concludes, "seems to be a
return to this pre-Central Bank rationale." 2 31
The substantial participation test is also criticized for its vagueness. 2 32
Under the ambiguous standard of "substantial participation" there is "no
threshold amount of involvement or participation necessary before
imposing primary liability upon secondary actors." 233 Courts applying the
substantial participation test have imposed primary liability on conduct
ranging from mere "review and discussion" of materials containing alleged
misstatements 234 to "knowingly certifying false and misleading financial
statements" for a client. 235 Under the substantial participation test, even
''secondary actors playing only a minor role" may be "subject to the same
consequences as primary violators.., responsible for actually making the
fraudulent misstatement or omission." 236
c. The Creator Test
In the 2002 case of In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA
Litigation, which resulted from one of the largest and most sensational
corporate scandals in American history, the distinction between primary
and "aiding and abetting" liability under Rule 1 Ob-5(b) became a contested
issue. 237 In Enron, the Southern District of Texas took issue with both the
226. Taylor, supra note 210, at 375.
227. See Mary M. Wynne, Comment, Primary Liability Amongst Secondary Actors: Why
the Second Circuit's "Bright Line " Standard Should Prevail, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 1607, 1625
(2000).




232. See Wynne, supra note 227, at 1625.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1625-26 (citing In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994)).
235. Id. at 1626 (citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 629 (9th Cir. 1997)).
236. Id. at 1624.
237. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
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bright-line and substantial participation tests, choosing to implement its
own test instead. 238
The Enron court criticized the bright-line test's requirement that the
misstatement be publicly attributed to the actor, holding it to be an improper
reading of section 10(b) and Central Bank.239 As section 10(b) makes it
unlawful for any person to "directly or indirectly" employ a deceptive
device in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 240 the Enron
court reasoned that "a person who creates a misrepresentation but takes care
not to be identified publicly with it, 'indirectly' uses or employs a deceptive
device or contrivance and should be liable under § 10(b)." 24 1 Thus, the
Enron court declined to apply the bright-line test, holding that it would
provide a "safe harbor from liability for everyone except those identified
with the misrepresentations by name" and "would place a premium on
concealment and subterfuge rather than on compliance with the federal
securities laws." 242
The Enron court also criticized the substantial participation test as vague
and overbroad.243 Stating that "such an expansive test ... may fail to
differentiate between primary liability and aiding and abetting,"244 the
Enron court rejected the substantial participation test, calling for "a clearer
definition and a narrowing of the kind of conduct and circumstances
required to constitute 'substantial participation.' 245
Drawing from the SEC's brief in Klein v. Boyd, a case that settled prior
to review by the Third Circuit en banc, the Enron court proposed its own
test for determining primary liability in 1 Ob-5 suits.246 This test, the creator
test, 247 provides that "when a person, acting alone or with others, creates a
misrepresentation [on which the investor-plaintiffs relied], the person can
be liable as a primary violator ... if... he acts with the requisite
scienter."248  Similar to the substantial participation test, a defendant's
name need not be associated with the misrepresentation for that defendant
to be held as a primary violator.249 The creator test, however, attempts to
define more clearly the threshold at which participation in a statement
238. Id. at 583-86.
239. Id. at 586.
240. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
241. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). It logically
follows that a person who creates a misrepresentation that is attributed to him or her would
have employed the deceptive device directly.
242. Id. at 587.
243. Id. at 585.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 586 n.24. There is no published Third Circuit decision available for Klein,
as the court vacated its opinion after granting a rehearing en banc, and the parties settled
prior to the rehearing. See id.; see also Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 WL
55245 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 1998).
247. See Mustokoff, supra note 2 t, at 21.
248. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id. at 586 n.24.
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becomes substantial enough to warrant primary liability. A primary
violator under the creator test must have "played such a substantial role in
the creation of the statement that [he or she] could fairly be said to be the
'author' or 'co-author' of the statement." 250 Under this standard, parties
only are responsible for the individual misstatements in which they
participated, rather than the entire document. Primary liability can attach
for knowingly Writing misrepresentations in a document to be given to
investors, "even if the idea from those representations came from someone
else." 251 However, a party who "prepares a truthful and complete portion
of a document would not be liable as a primary violator for
misrepresentations in other portions of the document. ' 252 Even if that
person knew about the other misrepresentations, "he or she would not have
created those misrepresentations" and therefore could not be held as a
primary violator. 253
3. Scheme Liability Under Rules l0b-5(a) and lOb-5(c)
The Enron decision also took issue with the post-Central Bank cases'
exclusive focus on misstatements and omissions. Drawing attention to the
little-used Rules 1Ob-5(a) and 1Ob-5(c), the Enron court reiterated the
Supreme Court's holding in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States254 that, "[w]hile subsection (b) of Rule lOb-5 provides a cause of
action based on [misstatements and omissions of material facts],
subsections (a) and (c) are not so restricted. '255 Denying that Rules lOb-
5(a) and (c) were "impliedly struck down in Central Bank merely because
[Central Bank] addressed only subsection (b) misrepresentation and
omission,"256 the Enron court interpreted Rule lob-5 as authorizing three
distinct causes of action: "scheme" liability under I Ob-5(a),
"misrepresentation or omission" liability under lOb-5(b), and "course of
business" liability under 1 Ob-5(c). 257
The scope of conduct actionable under Rules 1Ob-5(a) and (c), however,
remains unclear. The language of section 10(b) prohibits "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance." 258 Historically, the Supreme Court has
held that the term "[m]anipulation" is "virtually a term of art when used in
connection with securities markets," 259 referring to practices "intended to
250. Id.
251. Id. at 588.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
255. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 152-53)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id. at 589 n.31.
257. Id.
258. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
259. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
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mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity,"260 such as wash
sales, 261 matched orders, 262 or rigged prices. 263 Additionally, the Court has
interpreted "deception" as "the making of a material misrepresentation or
the nondisclosure of material information in violation of a duty to
disclose." 264 However, the Supreme Court also has held that section 10(b)
prohibits "all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception." 265 Thus, the Court held,
section 10(b) should be "construed 'not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."' 266  The Court's recent
repetition of this language in the 2002 case of SEC v. Zandford267 suggests
that this expansive view of the securities laws still remains in force.268
The lack of post-Central Bank case law on lOb-5(a) and (c) liability also
leaves the dividing line between primary violations and mere "aiding and
abetting" in question. The Enron case shed little light on the standard for
primary liability under Rules 1Ob-5(a) and (c). Applying a similar standard
for both subsections, Enron merely held that, "where a group of Defendants
allegedly participated in the scheme to defraud the public and enrich
themselves in connection with the purchase and sale of securities," any
defendant with the requisite scienter who "actively employed a significant
material device, contrivance, scheme, or artifice to defraud" would be
primarily liable under Rule lOb-5(a), and any defendant who "actively
engaged in a significant, material act, practice, or course of business that
operated as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" would be primarily liable under Rule lOb-
5(c). 269
II. THE SPLIT OVER SCHEME LIABILITY
After the Enron decision, securities fraud plaintiffs began filing claims
alleging "schemes to defraud" under Rules 1Ob-5(a) and (c) in addition to
260. Id.
261. Id. A wash sale is a "transaction involving no change in beneficial ownership."
Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 568 n.8 (citing Ernst, 425 U.S. at 205 n.25).
262. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476. Matched orders are "orders for the purchase/sale of a
security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of substantially the same size, at
substantially the same time and price, have been or will be entered by the same or different
persons for the sale/purchase of such security." Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 568 n.8.
263. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 568 n.8; Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
264. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 568 n.9 (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 470).
265. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7
(1971). The Court further held, "We do not think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely
because the alleged scheme does not involve the type of fraud that is usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities . . . . Novel or atypical methods should not provide
immunity from the securities laws." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
267. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
268. Id. at 819.
269. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
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the more traditional claims alleging "misrepresentations or omissions"
under Rule 1Ob-5(b). 270 Although the Enron court appeared to treat claims
for "scheme" liability under Rule 1 Ob-5(a) as separate causes of action from
claims for "course of business" liability under Rule 1Ob-5(c), 271 subsequent
courts and scholars have placed both rules under the awning of "scheme
liability" 272 and assessed both 1Ob-5(a) and 1Ob-5(c) claims under a single
standard.273
As scheme liability claims have proliferated, controversy has arisen over
the proper way to reconcile Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) liability with Central
Bank. As a result, the distinction between primary violators and "aiders and
abettors" under Rules lOb-5(a) and (c) has become a contested issue,
leading one commentator to refer to scheme liability as the "new
battleground in securities fraud litigation. '274 Whereas the earlier lOb-5(b)
cases examined the extent of primary liability for those who participate in
another party's fraudulent statement, 275 the new lOb-5(a) and (c) cases
generally examine whether primary liability extends to those who
participate in a business transaction with knowledge that the other party will
use the transaction to misrepresent its financial situation to investors. 276
Two opposing views have emerged as to the standard for primary
liability under Rules lOb-5(a) and (C). 2 7 7 The narrow view, embraced by
the Eighth Circuit in In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities
Litigation278 and the Fifth Circuit in Regents of the University of California
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.,279 holds that primary liability
under Rule lOb-5 extends only to parties who make material misstatements,
270. See In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 (D. Md. 2005)
(pleading an "omissions case" against certain defendants under Rule 1Ob-5(b) and a
"fraudulent scheme case" against all defendants under Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c)); In re Global
Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Plaintiffs here bring
their claims not only under Rule 1Ob-5(b), but also under the more general provisions of
Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c).").
271. See Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 589 n.31; see also supra note 257 and accompanying
text.
272. See Steiner v. MedQuist Inc., No. 04-5487 (JBS), 2006 WL 2827740, at *20-21
(D.N.J. 2006) (referring to "Rule 1 Ob-5(a) and (c) Scheme Liability"); Mustokoff, supra note
21, at 20 ("[Pllaintiffs are relying progressively more on the 'scheme' liability prongs of
Rule 1Ob-5: subsections (a) and (c).").
273. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2006)
cert. granted sub noma. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1873
(2007) (declining to differentiate between Rule 1Ob-5(a) and Rule 1Ob-5(c) claims); Simpson
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1046-48 (9th Cir. 2006) (referring generally to a
"scheme to defraud" without differentiating between lOb-5(a) and 1Ob-5(c)). In this Note,
the terms "scheme liability" and "scheme to defraud" refer to claims under both Rules lob-
5(a) and lOb-5(c).
274. Mustokoff, supra note 21, at 20.
275. See supra Part II.
276. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.,
482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007); Charter Commc'ns, 443 F.3d 987; Simpson, 452 F.3d 1040.
277. See infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
278. Charter Commc'ns, 443 F.3d at 997.
279. Regents, 482 F.3d at 387.
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make material omissions with a duty to disclose, or participate in the
limited range of "manipulative" trading practices defined in Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green.2 80 The broad view, favored by the Ninth Circuit
in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.,281 holds that defendants who act with
the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact are primarily
liable, even if those actions do not constitute a misstatement, omission, or
manipulative trading practice as defined in Santa Fe.2 82
In March 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Charter
Communications case, which will be argued as Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.283 In the Stoneridge case, which will be
argued in the October 2007 Term, 2 84 the Supreme Court is likely to adopt
one of these two views regarding the scope of scheme liability,28 5 which
could have implications in future tax shelter litigation. Part II.A of this
Note discusses the narrow approach to scheme liability favored by the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits, while Part II.B of this Note discusses the broad
approach favored by the Ninth Circuit.
A. Charter Communications, Regents,
and the Narrow View of Scheme Liability
The narrow view of scheme liability holds that primary liability under
I Ob-5(a) and (c) only extends to those who make misstatements of material
fact, omissions when they have a duty to disclose, or engage in one of the
manipulative trading practices discussed in Santa Fe.286
The Eighth Circuit case of Charter Communications involved a cable
company accused of defrauding its investors by falsely inflating the revenue
reported on its financial statements. 287 According to plaintiff investors, the
cable company entered into a scheme with two equipment vendors in which
the cable company agreed to pay an extra twenty dollars for each cable box,
and the vendors agreed to pay the extra money back to the cable company
as "advertising fees." 288  This arrangement allegedly allowed the cable
company to substantially overstate its revenue and cash flow, making the
280. 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). These practices include wash sales, matched orders, and
rigged prices. For a definition of these enumerated practices, see supra notes 261-63 and
accompanying text.
281. 452 F.3d at 1048.
282. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
283. 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007).
284. A list of cases to be argued during the October 2007 term appears on the U.S.
Supreme Court's website at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/07grantednotedlist.pdf.
285. See Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 28, at 3.
286. The narrow view has also been adopted by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia in the case of In re Federal National Mortgage Association Securities. Civ. Action
No. 04-1639(RJL), 2007 WL 1378464, at *5 n.3 (D.D.C. May 8, 2007) ("This Court finds
that the more restrictive interpretation ... adopted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits ... is in
better keeping with the Supreme Court's ruling in Central Bank.").
287. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2006).
288. Id.
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company appear stronger and more profitable to its investors and Wall
Street analysts. 289 Although plaintiffs did not allege that the vendors made
or participated in any false statements about the cable company's financial
health, 290 they argued that the vendors' knowing participation in sham
transactions aimed at falsifying the cable company's financial statements
rendered them primarily liable for participation in a scheme to defraud. 29 1
Plaintiffs argued that Rules lOb-5(a) and (c) were "broadly worded" and
"[did] not require proof of a fraudulent misrepresentation or failure to
disclose." 292 The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected plaintiffs' theory of
scheme liability, holding that such an expansive view of those rules did not
comport with an accurate reading of section 10(b) or Central Bank.293
According to the Eighth Circuit, Central Bank's holding that a private
plaintiff "'may not bring a 1Ob-5 suit against a defendant for acts not
prohibited by the text of § 10(b)' included claims under Rule lOb-5(a) and
(c), as well as Rule 1Ob-5(b). '294 Examining the language of section 10(b),
which prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," 29 5
the court looked to Santa Fe,296 where the Supreme Court defined
"manipulative" as a term of art encompassing certain trading practices and
"deceptive" as a misstatement of fact or a failure to disclose by one with a
duty to disclose. 297 Therefore, held the Eighth Circuit, "any defendant who
does not make or affirmatively cause to be made a fraudulent misstatement
or omission" or "who does not directly engage in manipulative securities
trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding and abetting and cannot be held
liable under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5." '298
As the vendors did not make any misstatements to investors, had no duty
to disclose information to the cable company's investors, and had no role in
approving the financial statements issued by the cable company, the
Charter Communications court refused to hold the vendors liable as
primary violators under any section of Rule lob-5.299 The court further
opined that "to impose liability for securities fraud on one party to an arm's
length business transaction in goods or services other than securities
because that party knew or should have known that the other party would
use the transaction to mislead investors" would "introduce potentially far-




293. Id. at 992.
294. Id. (quoting Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 173 (1994) (internal citations omitted)).
295. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
296. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
297. Charter Commc 'ns, 443 F.3d at 992; see supra notes 259-64.
298. Charter Commc'ns, 443 F.3d at 992.
299. Id. Neither the plaintiffs nor the court made any mention of "manipulative" trading
practices.
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reaching duties and uncertainties for those engaged in day-to-day business
dealings." 300
The Fifth Circuit case of Regents involved a similar scheme in which
Enron arranged to sell certain of its assets to banks on the promise that it
would buy the assets back at a premium six months later. 301 Enron then
used these arrangements to inflate the revenue listed on its year-end
financial statements. 30 2 Similar to Charter Communications, plaintiffs did
not allege that the banks made any misstatements to shareholders, but
argued that the banks should be held as primary violators for participation
in a fraudulent scheme. 303  Adopting the Eighth Circuit's view that
"deceptive" conduct covers only fraudulent misstatements and
omissions, 304 the Fifth Circuit refused to hold the banks liable as primary
violators. 30 5 According to the Fifth Circuit, the banks had no duty to
disclose information to Enron's shareholders, and therefore the
"transactions in which the banks engaged" amounted at most to aiding and
abetting "Enron's deceit by making its misrepresentations more
plausible." 306
B. Simpson and the Broad View of Scheme Liability
The broad view of scheme liability holds that defendants who act with
the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact are primarily
liable under Rule lOb-5, even if those actions do not constitute a
misstatement, omission, or manipulative trading practice as defined in
Santa Fe.30 7
Simpson, a Ninth Circuit case, also involved a company accused of
inflating its revenues through sham transactions with third parties. 308 In
these transactions, an Internet company allegedly bought assets from
various vendors at inflated prices. 309 According to plaintiffs, the vendors
then contracted with America Online for advertising on the Internet
company's web site, and America Online would return the money to the
Internet company through its own separate advertising agreement.310 The
300. Id. at 992-93.
301. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,
377 (5th Cir. 2007).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 388.
305. Id. at 390.
306. Id.
307. The broad view also has been adopted by the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey in Steiner v. MedQuist, Inc., Civil No. 04-5487 (JBS), 2006 WL 2827740, at
*21 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) ("The Court here finds [the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit]
persuasive.").
308. 452 F.3d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006).
309. Id. at 1044.
310. Id.
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Internet company then declared the returned money as revenue.3 1 i Similar
to Charter Communications and Regents, the Simpson court assessed
whether the vendors who participated in the transactions with the Internet
company were liable as primary violators under "scheme to defraud"
claims. 3 12
Formulating its view on scheme liability, the Ninth Circuit referenced the
Supreme Court's holding in Zandford3 13 that section 10(b) "should be
construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes." 3 14  Focusing on section 10(b)'s prohibition of "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," the Ninth Circuit broadly
defined "deception" as "engaging in a transaction, the principal purpose and
effect of which is to create a false appearance of fact."'3 15
According to the Ninth Circuit, a primary violator in a scheme to defraud
"must have engaged in conduct that had the principal purpose and effect of
creating a false appearance in furtherance of the scheme. ' 3 16 Under this
view of scheme liability, scienter alone does not turn a defendant into a
primary violator.3 17 Even if a defendant acts with intent to deceive, the
defendant is a mere aider and abettor of the scheme to defraud unless he
performs an action that actually creates a false appearance. 3 18 As the
Simpson court held, "It is not enough that a transaction in which a
defendant was involved had a deceptive purpose and effect; the defendant's
own conduct contributing to the transaction or overall scheme must have
had a deceptive purpose and effect. '3 19
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that the
plaintiffs failed to allege that either America Online or the vendors had
created a false appearance in furtherance of the scheme. According to the
Ninth Circuit, "illegitimate transactions in furtherance of a scheme to
misrepresent revenues" create a false appearance and are chargeable as
primary violations, while actions that merely "facilitate[] or assist[] the
fraudulent misreporting of legitimate transactions" do not themselves create
a false appearance and therefore only constitute "aiding and abetting." 320
As the complaint failed to allege that the transactions were illegitimate or
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1046.
313. 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (favoring an expansive view of the securities laws).
314. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
315. Id. at 1048. The Simpson court does not elaborate on the definition of
"manipulative." This Note assumes that the Simpson court accepts the Supreme Court's
definition of "manipulative" as expressed in Santa Fe.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 1048 n.5.
318. Id. ("A defendant may intend to deceive the public by substantially assisting
another's misconduct as part of a scheme to defraud, but fail to perform personally any
action that created a false appearance as part of this scheme.").
319. Id. at 1048.
320. Id. at 1052.
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that "actual advertisements were not purchased and sold" by the vendors,
the court held that plaintiffs had not alleged primary violations against
America Online or the vendors. 32' According to the court, a false
appearance was not created until the Internet company chose to
misrepresent the transactions in its financial statements. 322
The court also set a few guidelines for determining whether a defendant's
conduct has "a principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of
fact."'323 According to the court, "[c]onduct by the defendant that does not
have a principal legitimate business purpose" 324 may qualify, while
"[c]onduct that is consistent with the defendants' normal course of
business" typically would not.325 Also, "[p]articipation in a legitimate
transaction, which does not have a deceptive purpose or effect" would not
be considered a primary violation, "even if the defendant knew or intended
that another party would manipulate the transaction to effectuate a
fraud."326
III. FILING TAx SHELTER CASES ALLEGING SCHEME LIABILITY
UNDER RULES 1OB-5(A) AND 1OB-5(C)
Part III discusses the impact of the recent scheme liability decisions on
tax shelter litigation and contemplates how to reconcile scheme liability
under Rules 1Ob-5(a) and (c) with traditional "misstatement or omission"
liability under Rule 1Ob-5(b). Part III.A argues that, despite their difference
in language, the standards for primary liability set forth under both the
narrow view of Charter Communications/Regents and the broad view of
Simpson likely cover the same range of conduct. Part III.B of this Note
then discusses how tax shelter schemes differ markedly from schemes
discussed in previous 1Ob-5(a) and (c) lawsuits. Part III.C argues that under
321. Id. at 1053.
322. See id.
323. Id. at 1049.
324. Id. at 1050. The court gives as an example "the invention of sham corporate entities
to misrepresent the flow of income." Id. (citing In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2004) ("Sham business transactions with no
legitimate business purpose that are actually guaranteed 'loans' employed to inflate
Enron['s] financial image are not above-board business practices.")).
325. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1050 (citing Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 580) ("Conclusory
allegations that are consistent with the normal activity of such a business entity, standing
alone, ... are insufficient to state a claim of primary liability under Central Bank.") (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
326. Id. (The Simpson court recognizes that the Charter Communications court refused to
"impose primary liability 'on a business that entered into an arm's length non-securities
transaction with an entity that then used the transaction to publish false and misleading
statements to its investors and analysts."') (citing In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc. See. Litig.,
443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006)). The Simpson court also cited In re Parmalat Securities
Litigation, 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("At worst, the banks designed and
entered into the transactions knowing or even intending that Parmalat or its auditors would
misrepresent the nature of the arrangements. That is, they substantially assisted fraud with
culpable knowledge-in other words, they aided and abetted it.").
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both views of scheme liability, all tax shelter promoters are likely to be held
as primary violators. Part II.D suggests that defendants held as primary
violators under a theory of scheme liability should be held as primary
violators for all misstatements or omissions made in furtherance of the
scheme, even if they would not have been held as primary violators for each
individual misstatement.
A. Circuit Split or a Matter of Semantics?
The scholarship and case law following Charter
Communications/Regents and Simpson has framed these two views as a
circuit split over which conduct is actionable in scheme liability claims
brought under Rules lOb-5(a) and (c). 327 Both views certainly employed
opposite language while interpreting section 10(b)'s prohibition of
"manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s]." 32 8  Despite this
difference in language, it appears that both views may cover the same range
of conduct.
Charter Communications and Regents employed restrictive language in
their approach to scheme liability. 329 Invoking Central Bank's holding as a
"categorical declaration that a private plaintiff 'may not bring a lOb-5 suit
against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b)," 330 both
the Charter Communications and Regents courts restricted "deceptive"
conduct to material misstatements and omissions by those with a duty to
disclose, and restricted "manipulative" conduct to the limited number of
transactions discussed in Santa Fe.33' According to this view, any
defendant whose conduct does not fit into one of these categories "is at
most guilty of aiding and abetting" and "cannot be held liable under § 10(b)
or Rule lOb-5." '332
Conversely, Simpson employed expansive language in its approach to
scheme liability.33 3 Although Simpson did not challenge the narrow view's
327. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,
386 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Eighth and Ninth Circuits have split with respect to the scope of
primary liability for secondary actors."); In re Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n Sec., Civ. Action
No. 04-1639(RJL), 2007 WL 1378464, at *5 n.3 (D.D.C. May 8, 2007) (considering the
Ninth Circuit's standard "more liberal" than the Eighth Circuit's standard); Markel &
Ballard, supra note 21, at 994 ("The Ninth Circuit's decision [in Simpson] is at variance with
the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit [in Charter
Communications].").
328. SEC Rule lOb-5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2007). Compare supra Part II.A
(discussing the narrow language employed by Charter Communications and Regents), with
supra Part 1I.B (discussing the broad language employed by Simpson).
329. See supra Part II.A.
330. See supra note 294 and accompanying text; see also Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994).
331. See also supra note 297 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 298 and accompanying text; see also In re Charter Commc'ns Sec.
Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006).
333. See supra Part II.B.
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definition of "manipulative," 334 the Simpson court seemed to take a broader
approach to the term "deceptive." 335 Invoking the holding of SEC v.
Zandford that section 10(b) "should be construed not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes,"336 the court
held that deceptive conduct encompasses "engaging in a transaction, the
principal purpose and effect of which is to create the false appearance of
fact." 3 3 7
Under closer observation, however, it appears that this "split" simply
may be a matter of semantics.338 Gregory A. Markel and Gregory G.
Ballard, two New York securities litigators, believe that the Simpson test
covers "active participation in a fraudulent scheme by someone who does
not make a misstatement or omission, or engage in a manipulative securities
trade. ' 339 The courts, however, have yet to provide an example of a
"deceptive" act that does not involve a misrepresentation or omission, but
still would impose primary liability on the actor.
Although Simpson may use more expansive language than Charter
Communications, the conduct prohibited by the Simpson standard is
actually quite similar. According to Simpson, "It is not enough that a
transaction in which a defendant was involved had a deceptive purpose and
effect; the defendant's own conduct contributing to the transaction or
overall scheme must have had a deceptive purpose and effect." 340 Under
Simpson, a primary violator must affirmatively act in furtherance of the
scheme with the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff.341 Aside from the
"manipulative" acts discussed in Santa Fe,342 however, it appears that any
act whose "principal purpose and effect" is to "create a false appearance of
fact"343 can be classified as either a material misstatement or omission.
Obviously, a securities fraud defendant who intentionally transmits false
information to the plaintiff has acted with the "principal purpose and effect"
of "creat[ing] a false appearance of fact."'344
The inquiry then must turn to the extent of liability for nonspeaking
actors. Simpson made clear that a defendant who participates in a
transaction and merely is aware that the transaction eventually will be used
334. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
335. Markel & Ballard, supra note 21, at 1002 (considering Simpson's holding a "broader
view").
336. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also supra note 314 and accompanying text.
337. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006); see supra
note 323 and accompanying text.
338. See supra Part II.A-B.
339. Markel & Ballard, supra note 21, at 993.
340. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049.
341. See supra Part II.B.
342. See supra notes 298, 304 and accompanying text; see also Simpson, 452 F.3d at
1049.
343. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
344. See Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049.
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for a deceptive purpose is considered an "aider and abettor," and therefore
would not be liable under 1 Ob-5(a) or (c). 345 This holding appears to be in
accord with the holdings in Charter Communications and Regents that
primary liability does not attach without a misstatement of fact or a failure
to disclose by one who has a duty to disclose. 346 Without the duty to
disclose the true facts to the plaintiff, such as the duty created by a fiduciary
relationship, 347 a party's silence would not subject the party to primary
liability in 1 Ob-5(a) and (c) lawsuits under either view of scheme liability.
B. Tax Shelters: A Different Type of Scheme
To date, the only published cases addressing scheme liability under Rules
1Ob-5(a) and (c) have dealt with alleged schemes to defraud investors
through the publication of misleading company financial statements. 348 In
these cases, plaintiff-investors generally alleged that a company entered into
sham transactions with third parties and then used these transactions to
falsely inflate their reported revenue on public financial statements. 349
Although the plaintiffs in these cases levied claims against multiple actors,
these plaintiffs generally alleged that they were injured by a single fraud in
furtherance of the scheme: namely, the inflation of the company's stock
price through the issuance of misleading financial statements. 350 In these
cases, plaintiffs did not dispute that the company's underlying business was
legitimate, 351 nor did they dispute that the stock they bought had the
potential to generate profit.352 Additionally, plaintiffs in these cases did not
allege that the fraudulent scheme caused any losses beyond the money they
invested in the company.353
The tax shelter cases present a markedly different type of scheme than
any alleged in previous scheme liability cases. In the tax shelter cases,
plaintiffs were injured through a succession of separate frauds in
furtherance of the overall scheme. 354 Tax shelter promoters lured investors
into tax shelters with false representations about the legality of the shelters'
tax benefits355 and the independence of the legal opinions that sanctioned
those benefits. 356 The promoters also misrepresented the tax shelter's
potential to generate profit, causing investors to place money in the tax
shelter with virtually no chance of earning a return on their investment. 357
345. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
347. See infra Part III.C.
348. See supra Part II.A-B.
349. See supra Part II.A-B.
350. See supra Part II.A-B.
351. See supra Part II.A-B.
352. See supra Part II.A-B.
353. See supra Part II.A-B.
354. See supra Part 1.A.3.
355. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Also, lawyer-promoters charged plaintiffs excessive fees for opinion letters,
knowing that the letters' lack of independence rendered them ineffective in
protecting plaintiffs from IRS penalties.358 Additionally, the nonlawyer
promoters charged plaintiffs excessive fees to conduct illegitimate loss-
generating transactions, knowing that the IRS likely would never allow
plaintiffs to use the losses to reduce their taxes. 359  Furthermore,
accountant-promoters charged plaintiffs excessive fees to prepare tax
returns reflecting tax treatments the accountants knew were likely to be
invalidated by the IRS. 360 Finally, the combined representations and acts of
all promoters induced plaintiffs to file these returns, costing plaintiffs back
taxes, interest on back taxes, and penalties once the IRS discovered
plaintiffs had participated in an abusive tax shelter. 361
The role of professionals in tax shelter cases also differs markedly from
the role contemplated in both Central Bank and previous cases addressing
the extent of primary liability under Rule lOb-5. 362 In these prior cases,
professionals only appeared in their role as "gatekeeper" 363 for the
corporation issuing the fraudulent financial statements. 364 In most of these
cases, investors sued the corporation's accountants and lawyers for
preparing and approving the corporation's fraudulent financial statements in
furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 365 In tax shelter cases, professionals
were jointly responsible for creating the scheme, and then took an active
role in promoting the scheme to investors. 366 Even those promoters not
directly involved in the sales proposal were responsible for its content.367
The lawyer-promoters, whose true role in the scheme was not disclosed to
investors, allowed their names to be associated with the shelter, as their
legal opinions were essential to the shelter's marketability. 368 Once
investors agreed to participate in the tax shelter, professionals also provided
their services, creating fiduciary relationships with investors. 369
358. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
362. See supra Part I.C.1-2.
363. A "gatekeeper" is an outside professional (often an auditor or attorney) that advises a
corporation on the permissibility of its actions. A common function of a gatekeeper is to
"assess[] or vouch[] for the corporate client's own statements about itself or a specific
transaction." John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic
History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 280 (2004).
364. See supra Part I.C.2.a-c.
365. See supra Part I.C.2.a-c.
366. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 104-34 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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C. Tax Shelter Promoters Are Likely to Be Held as Primary Violators
Under Both Views of Scheme Liability
Under both the Simpson and Charter Communications/Regents tests, tax
shelter promoters are likely to be held as primary violators under Rules
lOb-5(a) and (c). As the original RICO lawsuits did not allege any of the
"manipulative" transactions discussed in Santa Fe, a court's inquiry likely
will focus on whether tax shelter promoters engaged in conduct considered
"deceptive" under section 10(b).
As discussed above, it is doubtful whether primary scheme liability under
Charter Communications and Regents differs materially from primary
scheme liability under Simpson.3 70 Even assuming a material distinction
exists between the narrow and broad views' definitions of the term
"deceptive," 37 1 such a distinction is largely irrelevant as to tax shelter
promoters. 3 72 In tax shelter cases, each successive fraud perpetrated by
promoters in furtherance of the tax shelter scheme would be covered under
the "more restrictive" Charter Communications/Regents test, since each
could be classified as either a misstatement of material fact or an omission
by someone with a duty to disclose. 373
Tax shelter promoters made a series of affirmative misstatements to
induce investors to invest money in the shelter and declare the shelter's tax
benefits on their tax returns. 374  The nonspeaking promoters had
collaborated with the speaking promoters in creating the misstatements used
in the sales pitch.375 Although one could argue that subsequent professional
services performed by the promoters could be considered "acts" rather than
statements or omissions, it is important to remember that these
professionals were in fiduciary relationships with investors376 and some
also were bound by written codes of professional ethics. 377 As both
professionals and fiduciaries, the promoters had duties of loyalty to their
clients' best interests and professional duties not to charge excessive
fees. 378 In these tax shelters, lawyers concealed that their opinion letters
were not independent, 379 accountants concealed that the tax returns they
prepared contained tax treatments unlikely to withstand IRS scrutiny,380 and
bankers/financial advisors concealed that the transactions they conducted
lacked economic substance and produced artificial losses that likely could
370. See supra Part III.A.
371. Compare supra Part II.A (discussing Charter Communications and Regents, which
use broad terms to define "deceptive"), with supra Part II.B (discussing Simpson, which uses
narrow terms to define "deceptive").
372. See infra notes 373-94 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
376. See supra Part I.A.3.
377. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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not be used to offset capital gains.381 Instead of acting in their investor-
clients' best interests and informing the investors that they had entered a
fraudulent scheme, these professionals chose to profit, accepting high fees
from the investor-clients for their services. 382
Under the Simpson test, tax shelter promoters also likely would be held
liable as primary violators under the theory of scheme liability. 383 The
"principal purpose and effect" 384 of all of the aforementioned misstatements
and omissions was to create the false appearance that the tax shelter was a
legitimate enterprise. 385  The promoters committed each successive
fraudulent act in furtherance of an overarching plan to market and
implement the tax shelter and thus defraud the investor out of his money.386
None of the transactions relating to the tax shelters had any "principal
legitimate business purpose," 387 nor were the transactions consistent with
any professional's "normal course of business." 388  A lawyer's normal
course of business does not involve charging excessive fees for fraudulent
legal opinions, nor does an accountant's, financial advisor's, or investment
banker's normal course of business involve charging excessive fees to
perform transactions lacking economic substance. Moreover, an
accountant's normal course of business does not involve preparing tax
returns claiming tax benefits the accountant knows to be abusive, nor does
any professional's normal course of business involve promoting and
implementing fraudulent tax shelter schemes for profit.
Reported tax shelter cases mention little about the parties from whom the
promoters acquired the financial instruments that were later used to
effectuate the tax shelter. 389 Plaintiffs did not file claims against these
parties in any reported lawsuit, nor do the facts suggest any impropriety in
the methods by which promoters acquired the instruments. 390 It is likely
that these parties are the "aiders and abettors" who Charter
Communications, Regents, and Simpson intended to exempt from liability
under Rules lOb-5(a) and (C). 3 9 1 Under the broad view's reasoning, these
parties made no misstatements to investors, and, even if they knew the
promoters would use the instruments for a tax shelter, they had no
relationship with investors that would impose a duty to disclose such
information. 392  Through Simpson's lens, the third party's simple
381. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
383. See supra Part II.B.
384. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
385. See supra Part I.A.3.
386. See supra Part I.A.3.
387. See supra note 324 and accompanying text; see also Simpson v. AOL Time Warner
Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006).
388. See supra note 325 and accompanying text; see also Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1050.
389. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
391. See supra Part II.A-B.
392. See supra Part II.B.
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knowledge that the instruments would later be used for a deceptive purpose
would not be enough to impose primary liability.393 Even if the promoters
entered the transactions with a deceptive purpose, no evidence indicates that
the parties who sold the instruments to the promoters did so with the
purpose of furthering the tax shelter scheme or for any other deceptive
purpose.39
4
D. Reconciling Scheme Liability with Traditional
"Misstatement or Omission " Liability
Charter Communications, Regents, and Simpson do not indicate how the
courts will reconcile claims for scheme liability under Rules 1 Ob-5(a) and
(c) with the more traditional "misrepresentation or omission liability" of
Rule 1 Ob-5(b). If one assumes that the parameters of scheme liability under
both Simpson and Charter are functionally equal, 395 then one could argue
that the only difference between scheme liability and traditional lOb-5(b)
liability is that scheme liability covers the "manipulative" trading practices
in Santa Fe in addition to the misstatements or omissions covered under
both theories. As tax shelter cases generally do not allege conduct
commonly viewed as "manipulative" by the federal courts, 396 one could
also argue that the standard of primary liability would be the same,
regardless of whether plaintiffs brought scheme liability claims under lOb-
5(a) or (c) or misrepresentation/omission claims under 1Ob-5(b).
The term "scheme," however, connotes more than just a series of
independent misrepresentations or omissions. Although the federal courts
never have defined "scheme" as used in Rule lOb-5(a), the Oxford English
Dictionary defines "scheme" as "a plan of action devised in order to attain
some end."'397 Under this definition, the tax shelters discussed in this Note
were fraudulent "schemes" in the true sense of the term. Tax shelter
promoters engaged in a premeditated plan of action to market and
implement fraudulent tax shelters, devised to achieve their desired end of
earning profit. Each promoter was instrumental in designing this plan of
action and played a predetermined role in its implementation.
A true scheme, such as the tax shelters discussed in this Note, represents
a whole greater than the sum of its constituent parts. The illusion of
legitimacy created through the concerted efforts of tax shelter promoters
hinged on a series of interdependent misstatements and omissions. Unless
promoters properly executed each successive misstatement or omission, the
tax shelter plan as a whole was doomed to fail.
393. See supra Part II.A.
394. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
395. See supra Part III.A.
396. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
397. Oxford English Dictionary 616 (2d ed. 1989).
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Rule lOb-5(b)'s prohibition of material misstatements and omissions398
seems to apply to single, independent misstatements and omissions, while
Rule lOb-5(a)'s prohibition of schemes to defraud seems to apply to
premeditated and concerted efforts to perpetrate an overarching fraud
through multiple misrepresentations and omissions. 399 Under the narrow
conception of 1Ob-5(b) "misstatement or omission" liability articulated by
the Second Circuit's bright-line test,400 a primary violator's name must be
associated with the fraudulent statement at the time it is disseminated. 401
Establishing primary liability under Rule lOb-5(b) against all promoters for
the entire operation could be problematic if certain parties' names were not
associated with certain specific misstatements. Scheme liability under Rule
lOb-5(a) or (c) should differ from Rule lOb-5(b) liability in this critical
respect. A party held primarily liable under Rules lOb-5(a) or (c) for
furthering a fraudulent scheme should be liable for all misstatements or
omissions committed in furtherance of that scheme, regardless of whether
the party would be held as a primary violator for each individual
misrepresentation or omission. When a party has played enough of an
integral role in planning and orchestrating a fraudulent scheme to be held as
a primary violator under lOb-5(a) or (c), he should be held as a "creator" of
every misstatement, similar to the concept articulated in the Enron case.402
This standard would ensure that each party would be held liable for the
wrongful conduct of others who commit fraud in furtherance of the scheme.
In previous scheme liability cases, which dealt with fraudulent financial
statements issued on behalf of a corporation, this concept was not much of
an issue. In both of these cases, the court found that only one party, the
corporation itself, was a primary violator. 403 Although multiple individuals
within the corporation may have been responsible for creating or
disseminating the fraudulent financial statements, all statements were issued
in the name of the corporation, and thus could be imputed to the
corporation. 404
In tax shelter cases, however, the promoters were not acting as agents of
a corporation to which all of their conduct could be imputed.40 5 Rather, the
tax shelter scheme itself, which did not take the form of an identifiable
entity, was their "principal." In determining scheme liability for tax shelter
promoters under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), the promoters' relationship should
be viewed similarly to a general partnership. By entering into an
arrangement to promote, market, and implement a tax shelter, each
promoter's actions on behalf of the overall scheme should be considered
398. See SEC Rule 1Ob-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(b) (2007).
399. See SEC Rule 1Ob-5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(a).
400. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
401. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
402. See supra Part I.C.3.
403. See supra Part II.A-B.
404. See supra Part II.A-B.
405. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
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binding on all other promoters when determining Rule 1Ob-5(a) and (c)
liability. When one promoter makes a misstatement during a sales pitch to
an investor, he speaks on behalf of all of the other promoters, even if the
investor is unaware of an individual promoter's involvement in the
statement. A lawyer who co-plans a tax shelter scheme is equally
responsible for misstatements made during the sales pitch by other
promoters, even though his true role is concealed to create an illusion of
legitimacy in his opinion letters. Under 1Ob-5(a) and (c), each promoter
also should be liable for his co-promoters' actions in furtherance of the
scheme. When a banker-promoter performs the orchestrated transactions on
behalf of the tax shelter scheme, all other promoters should be held
responsible for the consequences, even if they did not take part in the
transactions themselves.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of which standard the Supreme Court chooses to adopt in the
upcoming Stoneridge case, tax shelter promoters are likely to be considered
primary violators. However, litigating tax shelter fraud cases may be easier
for plaintiffs under Rules 1 Ob-5(a) and (c) than under 1 Ob-5(b). Rather than
having to prove that each promoter is responsible for each misstatement
made in furtherance of the scheme, plaintiffs can simply demonstrate the
existence of a premeditated scheme and prove that each promoter acted in
furtherance of that scheme.
Notes & Observations
